Guest Post

Making sense of Egypt's popular "coup"

The military intervention to depose Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, has been met with near universal approval by Coptic Christians. This community—which represents roughly 10 percent of the population—joined millions of Muslims in decrying the deterioration of security, the economy and national religious unity in the two years following the revolution. Morsi, they believe, was not only an incapable leader but also an active partisan for the Muslim Brotherhood.

Perhaps Morsi believed he had a mandate. Islamist parties won more than 70 percent of the seats in parliamentary elections held a year after the revolution. The Brotherhood and allied ultraconservative Salafi Muslim parties benefited from an innately conservative constituency, as well as from the opposition’s general disorganization. But by the time run-off elections pitted Morsi against a representative of the deposed Mubarak regime, popular support for Islamism was whittling away. Morsi squeaked out a victory, aided by many who were simply voting against the other guy. 

At first, Morsi appeared to understand the necessity of consensual governance. He won the support of several liberal activists and appointed a diverse team of advisors. But the challenge of the constitution made the whole situation unravel.